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Neighborhood Conservation Districts
THE NEW BELT AND SUSPENDERS
OF MUNICIPAL ZONING
William A. Fischel†
INTRODUCTION
In a comment about ten years ago, I argued that private
land use regulation was a complement to rather than a
substitute for public regulation.1 By this I meant that private
regulations should work hand-in-hand with public regulations,
rather than as alternatives to one another. Robert H. Nelson
had suggested that the rapid growth of homeowner associations
since 1970 would displace zoning and related public land use
controls at the municipal level.2 His hope was that such
displacement would free developers from the shackles of
municipal regulation, which he—and I—expected to cause
inefficiently low densities of homes and businesses.3
One of the problems with Nelson’s plan was the difficulty
of establishing private community associations in alreadydeveloped areas. Once an area is built up, neighbors are unlikely
to agree to the covenants and related restrictions to establish a
system of private governance.4 This is why nearly all examples of
successful homeowner associations are those that are initially
set up by a developer, who then sells the lots to buyers who have
no choice but to accept the covenants and governance structure.
†

Professor of Economics and Hardy Professor of Legal Studies, Dartmouth College.
William A. Fischel, The Rise of Private Neighborhood Associations:
Revolution or Evolution?, in THE PROPERTY TAX, LAND USE AND LAND-USE REGULATION
273 (Dick Netzer ed., 2003).
2
Robert H. Nelson, The Rise of Private Neighborhood Associations: A
Constitutional Revolution in Local Government, in THE PROPERTY TAX, LAND USE AND
LAND-USE REGULATION, supra note 1, at 256.
3
William A. Fischel, Does the American Way of Zoning Cause the Suburbs of
Metropolitan Areas to Be Too Spread Out?, in GOVERNANCE AND OPPORTUNITY IN
METROPOLITAN AREAS 151 (Alan Altshuler et al. eds., 1999).
4
Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace
Zoning with Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 827, 828 (1999).
1
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It now appears that this problem has been overcome by
“neighborhood conservation districts,” which are in many ways
similar to private regulations but do not require the consent of all
property owners in the neighborhood. However, these new
institutions have not become vehicles to facilitate neighborhood
change, as Nelson had hoped. They are instead quite
conservative—as their name implies—and are used to discourage
redevelopment that is inconsistent with existing patterns. The
quasi-privatization of land use in this case has been a vehicle to
ramp up regulation, not release the energies of developers.
Beyond describing the major characteristics of the new
conservation districts, I will speculate on why homeowners
have increased the demand for regulation beyond what is
provided by more traditional zoning mechanisms. Fragmentary
evidence suggests that the main reasons have been growth in
the value of housing and attempts by higher governments and
the courts to interfere—as most communities view them—in
the regulatory affairs of municipalities. In short, additional
local regulation may be a response to attempts to shoehorn
affordable housing, cell-phone towers, and group homes into
existing neighborhoods.
I.

MUNICIPAL POLITICS AND ZONING

Because the occasion for this essay was a conference
held at Brooklyn Law School in the City of New York, I need to
explain why zoning in much of the rest of the nation might be
different than in its largest municipality. The simplest and
most widely used model of local political behavior is the one we
learned in high-school civics: the majority of voters get their
way. Economists and many political scientists have adopted
this model and bent it to their purposes in analyzing public
decisions. Known as the median voter model, it supposes that
preferences for local public issues like zoning can be ranked on
a scale of “least preferred” to “most preferred,” and that the
voters in the middle of the scale—the median voter—prevail on
every issue.5 Thus, the voters who rank zoning on the middle of
the scale—say, with some restrictions, but none so detailed as to
forestall all development options—will get the zoning they want.
Studies of the relationship between municipal-service
levels and the characteristics of local voters support the median
5

See generally Randall G. Holcombe, The Median Voter Model in Public
Choice Theory, 61 PUB. CHOICE 115 (1989).
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voter model, especially for cities and towns.6 But it is somewhat
less successful at the state and national level, and for larger
cities and counties, because of the problems of rational
ignorance (caused by the knowledge that one’s vote has a very
low chance of affecting the outcome of an election), the size and
complexity of government, and the possibility that a
heterogeneous electorate may have conflicting demands for
government services and the taxes that pay for them. In these
contexts, interest groups that speak for various constituencies,
especially those who more directly profit from government
activities, step in to displace the voters.7
The upshot of this model of politics is that land use
regulation in the suburbs and small cities and towns is very
likely to match the preferences of local residents. In other work
I have claimed that the local voters who are both most
numerous and most acutely interested in zoning issues are
homeowners.8 These “homevoters”9 shape zoning to serve their
interests in the suburbs and smaller cities. But zoning in the
suburbs is also shaped by the fact that the municipalities are
usually numerous, meaning that potential residents can “vote
with their feet” and reject jurisdictions whose rules do not
comport with their demands. This tends to homogenize voter
preferences within communities and reinforces the median
voter model, because those who have differing preferences from
the majority will opt for other locations.10
The foregoing view of local politics implies that
residents of smaller cities and suburbs ought to be more
satisfied with their local zoning than residents of larger cities
and counties. City residents have to tussle with developmentminded interest groups within city politics, while suburban
residents can make developers dance to the music of existing
homeowners.11 Tiebout-style migration—whereby households
“vote with their feet” for their preferred public services—
6

Geoffrey K. Turnbull & Peter M. Mitias, The Median Voter Model Across
Levels of Government, 99 PUB. CHOICE 119, 136 (1999).
7
Heather Rose & Jon Sonstelie, School Board Politics, School District Size,
and the Bargaining Power of Teachers’ Unions, 67 J. URB. ECON. 438, 472-73 (2010).
8
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT, TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE
POLICIES 1, 4 (2001).
9
Id. at 1.
10
Fernando Ferreira & Joseph Gyourko, Do Political Parties Matter?
Evidence from U.S. Cities, 124 Q.J. ECON. 399, 402 (2009).
11
See GARY J. MILLER, CITIES BY CONTRACT: THE POLITICS OF MUNICIPAL
INCORPORATION 86 (1981).
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mitigates some of these problems12: People who like the mixed
urban neighborhoods that were celebrated by Jane Jacobs13 will
buy or rent in big cities. Those with a yen for open spaces will
accept the remoteness of exurban communities in exchange for
very large lot sizes. And large numbers of people who want safe
and pleasant streets that are separated but not too far from
commercial districts will gravitate to the in-between suburbs,
where most of the urban population now resides.14
Despite the sorting of households by neighborhood
tastes, a great deal of uncertainty still exists about the
character of neighborhoods. Even in places where commerce,
class, and race are statistically mixed, many residents harbor
anxieties about how the neighborhood may change.15 As a result,
one would expect to see some additional layers of regulation in
communities experiencing higher levels of uncertainty and
pressures for change. Higher uncertainty about neighborhood
change can be measured across communities at any given time,
say the year 2013, and it could manifest in changes in existing
communities over time, say from 1990 to 2006.
II.

ADDITIONAL LAND USE CONTROLS

The once and future of land use regulation is the
protective covenant. It preceded zoning regulations and made a
comeback fifty years after zoning first gathered steam in the
1920s.16 Covenants were initially elbowed aside by zoning
because of legal and administrative difficulties and because
covenants could not practically be applied to larger areas.
Large-scale developers in southern California found that their
units were less marketable when lower-quality development
was parked adjacent to their protected neighborhoods.17
Developers lobbied both state and (eventually) national officials
to promote municipal zoning in order to protect their
investments. On the other side of the coin, large cities such as
12

See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956); see also Eric J. Heikkila, Are Municipalities Tieboutian Clubs?, 26
REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON. 203 (1996).
13
JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 220 (1961).
14
Peter Mieszkowski & Edwin S. Mills, The Causes of Metropolitan
Suburbanization, 7 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 135, 135-36 (1993).
15
William A. Fischel, Why Are There NIMBYs?, 77 LAND ECON. 144, 144 (2001).
16
ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BOURGEOIS NIGHTMARES: SUBURBIA, 1870–1930, at
110-11, 114 (2005).
17
MARC A. WEISS, THE RISE OF THE COMMUNITY BUILDERS: THE AMERICAN
REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY AND URBAN LAND PLANNING 21, 62-63 (1987).
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Los Angeles found that without stable zoning, residential
development would “move to the nuisance” and pressure city
officials to displace industry through regulation.18 This process
threatened the city’s industrial development, resulting in lost
tax revenue and unemployment. In response, Los Angeles
developed comprehensive zoning to provide secure and
separate locations for industry and residences.19 By 1930,
almost all major cities had implemented zoning that promoted
stable expectations about future development.20 Covenants had
largely fallen into disuse, displaced by zoning.21
The private covenant made a comeback in the 1970s on
two fronts. The first was its application to multi-unit apartment
dwellings that were owner-occupied as condominiums.22 Inflation
in the 1970s begat an increase in local rent-control regulations,
and developers of new apartment units dealt with this by selling
their units as owner-occupied housing, which was not subject to
rent control.23 Nevertheless, the role of the apartment owner and
his on-site “super” eventually needed to be replaced, and
developers therefore created the condominium association
(composed of the units’ owners) in order to manage common
areas and provide and enforce local regulations.
The second front came as developers transferred the
experience of condominium associations to new communities of
owner-occupied housing units. Although the units were usually
free standing, developers found that marketing them was more
profitable if they were endowed with homeowner associations
and constitution-like rules for governance. The great
improvement of the homeowner association was that it
provided for active management of common areas and for
enforcement of rules. It was also possible for homeowner
associations to modify their constitutional rules without the

18

Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394, 397 (1915); Kathy A. Kolnick, Order
Before Zoning: Land Use Regulation in Los Angeles, 1880–1915, at 246-47 (May 2008)
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California) (on file with Digital Library).
19
Kolnick, supra note 18, at 246-47.
20
William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for Its
Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB. STUD. 317, 319 (2004).
21
Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules,
and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 714-19 (1973).
22
See, e.g., ROBERT JAY DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 51 (1992).
23
See, e.g., David P. Sims, Out of Control: What Can We Learn From the End
of Massachusetts Rent Control?, 61 J. URB. ECON. 129 (2007).
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unanimity that traditional covenants required, which enabled
them to respond more efficiently to unforeseen changes.24
Despite the rise of homeowner associations in the 1970s,
they did not displace zoning regulations. Indeed, homeowner
associations often monitor local zoning and send
representatives to zoning and planning hearings.25 In this role,
the associations strengthen zoning: they provide belt-andsuspenders support for new development by supplementing
zoning. In economic terms, zoning and community associations
seem to be complements, not substitutes.26
Older neighborhoods that were developed without
covenants and homeowner associations had to rely on
traditional zoning to protect their homes from unforeseen
events. Indeed, the transaction costs of obtaining the
agreement of all property owners within most neighborhoods
would be prohibitive.27 Economists are apt to point out the
holdout problems that give rise to these costs: if almost all other
residents agree to restrictions on otherwise permissible
nonconforming development, the remaining landowners are in a
position that raises the option value of their property. An
apartment building surrounded by single-family units might
generate rental profits greater than one surrounded by other
apartment buildings. In my experience, however, the
transactions costs stem less from deliberate holdouts than from
the difficulty of contacting property owners28: Some may live in a
different state or country. Some may live in nursing homes.
Some may disagree on terms with co-owners. And some may find
it difficult just to understand the nature of the proposed deal.
In
small,
relatively
homogenous
communities,
homeowners can rely on public zoning to adjust to new
conditions. Even in smaller towns where neighborhoods differ
substantially, the multidimensional log rolling of small-town
life and norms of reciprocity stay the hand of collective
opportunism.29 For example, although it might benefit the tax
24

ROBERT H. NELSON, PRIVATE
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 10 (2005).
25

NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE TRANSFORMATION

Barbara Coyle McCabe, Homeowners Associations as Private Governments: What
We Know, What We Don’t Know, and Why It Matters, 71 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 535, 537 (2011).
26
Rachel Meltzer & Ron Cheung, Homeowners Associations and the Local
Land Use Regime: Substitutes or Complements?, 46th Annual AREUEA Conference
Paper (Nov. 29, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract+1717024.
27
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, DO GROWTH CONTROLS MATTER? 14 (1990).
28
I once explored the possibility of doing this in my neighborhood to forestall
the conversion of a home to apartments.
29
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 182 (1991).
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base to allow a commercial development in a neighborhood that
does not want it, the development may not happen because
other residents typically know at least some of the threatened
neighborhood residents through local schools, civic organizations,
and private clubs.30
A threatened neighborhood in a larger polity is less
secure for several reasons. Neighborhood residents are less
likely to know people elsewhere in a larger city or county.
Development interests are more likely to hold sway in city
councils and planning commissions.31 And the overall size of
government makes it less likely that government officials will
know much about their constituents and vice versa. To counter
this, cities have some institutions that specifically protect
neighborhoods. For example, city councils are often elected by
wards rather than at large, and city service administration and
planning districts are often divided into distinct regions or
neighborhoods, whose residents get a special voice in citycouncil and planning-board proceedings.32 Nevertheless, the
literature on the political economy of planning and city
governance supports the idea that larger cities are more prodevelopment than their suburbs.
III.

HISTORIC DISTRICTS

Historic districts provide one way for a distinct
neighborhood to establish additional land use regulations that
are resistant to citywide changes. They became popular in the
1970s and seem to have been an offshoot of the landmarkpreservation movement, whose poster child was the demolition
of Penn Station in New York City. In response to that decision,
the U.S. Supreme Court validated uncompensated preservation
designations in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York in 1978,33 and most state courts went along with the idea
that regulations designed to preserve the outer shell of
buildings constitute legitimate exercises of the police power.34

30

FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 200-02.
Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political
Economy of Place, 82 AM. J. SOC. 309, 320 (1976).
32
Mark Schneider & Paul Teske, The Antigrowth Entrepreneur—Challenging
the Equilibrium of the Growth Machine, 55 J. POL. 720, 732 (1993).
33
438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
34
See generally Daniel T. Cavarello, From Penn Central to United Artists’ I
& II: The Rise to Immunity of Historic Preservation Designation from Successful
Takings Challenges, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 593, 594, 616 (1995).
31
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Historic districts—in which entire blocks of buildings
were subject to preservation and hence made extra-resistant to
neighborhood change—soon spread and were similarly
validated by the courts. Owners of individual historic
landmarks often resisted official designation, however, because
the additional restrictions occasionally triggered costs that
exceeded compensatory tax breaks and the benefit of free
advertising.35 But owners of most buildings in historic districts,
on the other hand, obtain net benefits from the added security
against zoning changes, and groups of property owners often
seek historic designation as a result. Indeed, studies have
shown that such designation raises their property values as
compared to undesignated neighborhoods.36
Historic districts thus emerged as one way to protect a
neighborhood from the risks of unwanted change while also
avoiding the prohibitively high transaction costs involved in
forming a legally binding homeowner association after
neighborhoods had actually formed.37 But historic districts have
some drawbacks. One is the requirement that the district actually
be historic, although this is less of a problem than it might seem.
For example, buildings do not have to be centuries old. Indeed,
fifty years will often do—and sometimes even less than that.38 A
good number of urban neighborhoods can therefore qualify.
The more serious difficulty with historic districts is that
they offer excessive protection from change. Residents in some
localities fear that future modifications of their own property
may be unduly restricted.39 In these districts, even relatively
minor alterations, such as the installation of new windows, are

35

Paul K. Asabere et al., The Adverse Impacts of Local Historic Designation:
The Case of Small Apartment Buildings in Philadelphia, 8 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON.
225, 227 (1994).
36
Edward Coulson & Michael L. Lahr, Gracing the Land of Elvis and Beale
Street: Historic Designation and Property Values in Memphis, 33 REAL EST. ECON. 487,
488 (2005); Deborah Ann Ford, The Effect of Historic District Designation on SingleFamily Home Prices, 17 AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. ASS’N J. 353, 361 (1989).
37
Hannah Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO. L.J. 697,
712-16 (2010).
38
NORMAN TYLER ET AL., HISTORIC PRESERVATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS
HISTORY, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICE 140 (2d ed. 2009).
39
Sarah Schweitzer, Starbucks Proposal Highlights Historic Concerns:
Demolition Plan Renews Calls for More Protection, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 23, 2007, at
GNW.1 (“The creation of neighborhood conservation districts is needed, advocates say,
because towns such as Merrimack, NH have rejected the more stringent form of
preservation—so-called local historic districts—out of fear that the regulation would
stifle development.”).
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subject to the review of a commission.40 Commission members
are usually drawn from the ranks of preservationists rather
than one’s fellow neighbors, so they are less likely to be
sympathetic to the need for an additional bedroom or an
expanded garage. According to preservationist principles, this
is as it should be. One rationale for historic districts is that
individual owners and the local neighborhood may
underappreciate the building’s historical value.
Another drawback of historic districts is that
considerable intellectual controversy surrounds the issue of
historic preservation of buildings. For example, most buildings
that were built a century ago, or even fifty years ago, have
endured considerable modification before being designated
“historic.” As a result, it is often not clear what period of their
development is to be preserved.41 And at least some urban
theorists have questioned the wisdom of any mandatory
preservation of neighborhoods.42 Indeed, the conventional role
of cities has usually been as future-oriented engines of change,
not museums of the past.43 Architects such as Rem Koolhaas
worry that excessive zeal for preservation might stifle ongoing
creativity in their profession.44
IV.

NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION DISTRICTS

The gap between consensual neighborhood covenants and
citywide zoning is, for reasons suggested in the previous section,
imperfectly filled by historic districts. Partially filling this gap
are neighborhood conservation districts, which have become
popular since the early 1980s.45 These districts differ from
traditional zoning districts, with their SR-2 (single residence)
and GR-1 (multifamily) designations, in that conservation
districts provide additional restrictions (and sometimes,
exceptions) to a geographic area that is not necessarily
contiguous with zoning boundaries. For example, a neighborhood
conservation district may consist of several contiguous city
blocks, some of which are designated SR-2 and others GR-1.
40

Adam Lovelady, Note, Broadened Notions of Historic Preservation and the
Role of Neighborhood Conservation Districts, 40 URB. LAW. 147, 148-54 (2008).
41
TYLER ET AL., supra note 38, at 18.
42
See EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY: HOW OUR GREATEST
INVENTION MAKES US RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER, HEALTHIER, AND HAPPIER 263 (2011).
43
Id.
44
Nicolai Ouroussoff, An Architect’s Fear that Preservation Distorts, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 2011, at C1.
45
Lovelady, supra note 40, at 154.
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The neighborhood conservation district usually applies
additional rules for development and modification of homes, but it
typically does not exempt them from the standards of the zoning
district where they are located. Thus a home in the SR-2 district
of the city might be required to have a thirty-foot setback from the
street line and be no more than thirty-five feet high. Additional
rules concerning the placement of garages, size of windows, and
type of roofing could be imposed, which would not be applied to
homes outside the neighborhood conservation district.
The districts themselves are usually established as the
result of neighborhood activism.46 In many cases, the catalyst
for a neighborhood conservation district is the demolition of an
existing building and construction of a new structure that is
consistent with existing zoning laws but is regarded by existing
residents as inappropriate for the neighborhood.47 The city’s
planning and zoning department usually does not seek to
establish subdistricts. Several cities, however, seem to have
established procedures for setting up neighborhood districts.48
They usually require that the buildings in the area have
something in common.49 The common elements do not have to
be historical: they could be a consistent architectural style, a
common street layout, or a local community focal point such as
a park or a school.50 They could also simply be a neighborhood
that is undergoing some development pressures that residents
collectively want to resist.51
In most cases, a neighborhood conservation district is an
overlay zone, which adds some restrictions to the designated
area without changing its underlying zoning.52 One example of
overlay zones is a flood-plain zone, which establishes additional
restrictions to reduce flood damage.53 Overlay zones do not
establish independent neighborhood authority over rezoning or
development proposals but are instead administered by the
city’s existing zoning and planning apparatus. The very
46

ELIZABETH DURFEE HENGEN WITH CAROLYN BALDWIN, N.H. DIV. OF
HISTORICAL RES., NEIGHBORHOOD HERITAGE DISTRICTS: A HANDBOOK FOR NEW
HAMPSHIRE MUNICIPALITIES 8 (2008), available at http://www.nh.gov/nhdhr/documents/
neighbors_hert_handbook.pdf.
47
Lovelady, supra note 40, at 180.
48
Id. at 156.
49
Id. at 154.
50
Id.
51
HENGEN, supra note 46, at 8.
52
Id.
53
AMY DAIN, RESIDENTIAL LAND-USE REGULATION IN EASTERN MASSACHUSETTS:
A STUDY OF 187 COMMUNITIES 18 (2005).
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existence of the overlay district, however, refocuses the
attention of citywide administrators and board members
toward the concerns of neighborhood members, and the usual
public-notice procedures for such zoning changes and building
permits ensure that the district’s residents are informed.
Some neighborhood conservation districts establish an
additional review of development by a newly created standing
committee, which is partially comprised of neighborhood
residents.54 These committees are interesting because they
resemble the boards of homeowner associations that private
developers set up to govern common areas in condominiums
and planned communities. But those private governing bodies
had to be established without any dissenters among property
owners. This meant that the initial developer had to own all
the land at the start. The remarkable aspect of neighborhood
districts is that they can be established with less than
unanimity among property owners—sometimes with only a
majority vote of the city council or its electorate.55
The powers of the neighborhood conservation district’s
governing body are typically more modest than those of a
private community association. One major limitation is that its
decisions can be appealed to some public authority—typically
the city’s planning board and the elected city council.56 For
example, if the neighborhood review committee rejects a
proposed front-yard garage that otherwise conforms to
underlying zoning rules, the would-be garage builder can
appeal that decision to city authorities and potentially to the
court system. But to do so, one must start with the lowest level
of regulation and exhaust all remedies before appealing
further, which would be a time-consuming and expensive task.
The neighborhood conservation district functions in large part
like a private community association, albeit having arisen not
from private property law but from public police power regulation.

54

See, e.g., HENGEN, supra note 46, at 10.
See id. (city council or townwide vote); see also CAMBRIDGE HISTORICAL
COMM’N, NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION DISTRICTS IN CAMBRIDGE (Oct. 2002),
available at http://www2.cambridgema.gov/historic/ncd_brochure.pdf (The city council
votes after findings of neighborhood committee are presented.); Cambridge Historical
Comm’n, Historic Districts and Neighborhood Conservation Districts in Cambridge,
MA, CAMBRIDGEMA.GOV, http://www2.cambridgema.gov/historic/districts.html (last
visited Feb. 2, 2013).
56
HENGEN, supra note 46, at 14; Lovelady, supra note 40, at 157.
55
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WHY THE DEMAND FOR MORE LOCAL REGULATION?

The development of neighborhood conservation districts
parallels several other decentralizing developments in
municipal governance. In some ways, they resemble the
business improvement district (BID), where property owners are
willing to be burdened with additional taxes in exchange for
additional municipal services.57 As in the neighborhood
conservation district, the formation of BIDs does not require
unanimous consent of the neighborhood’s property owners.58
Another parallel trend is the charter-school movement, which
establishes self-governing schools within standard city school
districts, though in that case the local residents do not pay
additional taxes.59
All of these approaches—BIDs, charter schools, and
neighborhood conservation districts—represent subdivisions of
existing municipal functions. I would characterize them as
small umbrellas within the city’s larger umbrella, and all of
them have become especially popular within the last twenty or
thirty years. The common denominator among these
approaches is localized dissatisfaction with the citywide
provision of a local service.60 They are almost always generated
by bottom-up political activity.61 The citywide government
seems to accommodate them somewhat grudgingly, and
scholarly commentary has criticized them for their seeming
withdrawal from traditional government oversight.62
One explanation for their rise, then, is the same
explanation for suburban municipal incorporations in the
twentieth century that has created the municipal collar—some
would say noose—that surrounds most large American cities.63
Homeowners and other property owners demanded different
levels of public services than those provided in the central city
57

Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement
Districts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 366 (1999).
58
Id. at 457.
59
James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice,
111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2075 (2002).
60
One such example is public safety. See Leah Brooks, Volunteering to be
Taxed: Business Improvement Districts and the Extra-Governmental Provision of Public
Safety, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 388 (2008).
61
HENGEN, supra note 46, at 3.
62
See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 57, at 457; Paul Teske et al., Local School
Boards as Authorizers of Charter Schools, in BESIEGED: SCHOOL BOARDS AND THE
FUTURE OF EDUCATION POLITICS 130 (William G. Howell ed., 2005).
63
JON C. TEAFORD, CITY AND SUBURB: THE POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION OF
METROPOLITAN AMERICA, 1850–1970, at 79 (1979).
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that sought to annex them. In the early part of the century,
before zoning became available, municipal independence was
costly because small suburbs had no way to resist or manage
the inevitable urban growth. City services—schools, water,
sewer, fire and police protection—looked attractive if your town
was going to become a city anyway.64 But after zoning became
available, many suburbs decided they did not have to become
so urban, after all. They could remain residential, establish
their own public schools, and control their own growth.65
Municipalities and school districts hardly ever subdivide
after they are formed.66 Thus, residential developments that
were built within a preexisting municipality had to accept the
level of services provided by the city, which might be controlled
by political forces that were not always sympathetic to new
residents. One interpretation of the neighborhood conservation
district is that it represents a partial secession from the
governance of the larger city. And this might be acceptable to
most elected officials. For example, a working-class city might
want to prevent its professional-class residents from moving to
a more affluent municipality, so one way of appeasing them
would be to provide residents of the upper-class blocks greater
control over land use within their neighborhood.67 Thereafter,
the higher-income residents of the more protected
neighborhood would be less concerned over city officials’
inclination to bring in job-creating land uses—that is, uses that
have some adverse spillovers but are desired by the workingclass majority. The working-class majority would get the fiscal
benefits of taxes on higher-value properties in the affluent
neighborhood, and the more affluent residents could enjoy
living in a diverse community as well as the benefits of an
urban location instead of a white-bread suburb.68
A more difficult question is why neighborhood
conservation districts have become increasingly popular in
recent years. My theory is that threats to homeowners’ real
estate values have increased in the past forty years. The threats
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are partly the result of increases in real estate values in cities,
which have encouraged developers to press for changes in use
and for increases in density. The increased values are not
entirely the product of the late housing bubble. Larger cities
have also become more attractive because of the steady decline
in violent and other crime over the past two decades.69
Homebuyers who would otherwise have fled to the suburbs
reexamined cities, and as a result, higher-quality, wellestablished urban residential districts became more popular.
The other trend promoting neighborhood conservation
districts has been the attack on local zoning by higher
governments and the court system, as well as by changes in
planning ideology.70 Many of these trends affected suburban
and small-town municipalities, as well as larger cities, which is
why even some of the former may have adopted neighborhood
conservation districts despite the greater responsiveness of
suburban public officials to their homeowner-constituents. The
federal government has adopted several rules that override the
authority of local governments: group homes for the disabled
cannot be excluded from residential neighborhoods;71 cell-phone
towers must be accommodated somewhere, not just excluded;72
and churches must be allowed to expand their operations
despite local zoning.73
The courts have also played a role in modifying local
zoning authority. The Mount Laurel cases in New Jersey
declared that exclusion of low-income housing must cease and
that the remedy was to override local zoning that prohibited
apartments.74 While other state courts have not embraced New
Jersey’s comprehensive statewide remedy, many have cited
69
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Mount Laurel approvingly.75 Several state governments, most
notably Massachusetts, have required local governments to
rezone for low- and moderate-income housing.76 These cases are
in part the product of a legal movement to make suburban living
more accessible to low-income families and people of color.77
Finally, planners have advocated for changes to local
zoning practices. The “smart growth” movement that has become
popular among the planning profession has attacked low-density
development in the suburbs and urged higher-density infill
development within established city neighborhoods.78 The
environmental movement has endorsed higher-density city
development to reduce carbon emissions from automobiles and
single-family homes.79 And the exclusion of development from
rural farmland has pushed at least some homebuilders back into
cities.80 Economists have urged that local zoning be overridden in
order to promote higher densities than local zoning allows.81
All of these trends have put traditional zoning
techniques under stress. The diversity of neighborhoods in
larger cities makes homeowners in vulnerable neighborhoods
nervous about infill development and other pressures for
change. By building on the historic-preservation model,
neighborhood activists continue to develop zoning innovations
that resist these trends or at least modify them to suit local
circumstances. Like politics, all zoning is local.
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